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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-~--------------------------~---------------------------~------
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his Wife, 
Respondents, 
VS. 
F. CARL FARNSWORTH and 
ANN H. FARNSWORTH, his Wife; 
and JON LEE TORGERSON and 
MAVIS TORGERSON, his Wife, 
Appellants. 
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Case No. 18142 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an equitable action brought by Respondents 
for specific enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
entered into by and between the parties. 
II. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Sixth Judicial District Court granted Respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment requiring Appellants to transfer 
title to certain real property to Respondents upon payment by 
Respondents to Appellants of certain sums, each party to bear 
its own costs and attorney's fees. 
-1-
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III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask this Court to reverse the judgment of 
the district court in toto, remanding the matter for trial. 
Respondents, by way of cross-appeal, also seek the reversal 
of the judgment of the district court insofar as said court 
refused to grant an award of costs and attorney's fees in 
favor of Respondents. Further, Respondents ask this Court to 
award costs and attorney's fees in favor of Respondents on 
this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In their initial Brief, Appellants set forth a 
concise Statement of relevant Facts supported by the record 
on file herein. Notwithstanding Respondents' objections 
thereto, Appellants believe that said Statement accurately 
relates only relevant and material facts including those to 
which counsel for Respondents stipulated at the hearing held 
on October 16, 1981. (Transcript 22). Additional facts set 
forth in Respondents' Brief, while fairly accurate, tend to 
confuse the simple issues rather than isolate them. Therefore 
Appellants will rely on their prior proffered Statement. 
-2-
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\ ~ ! • ARGUMENT 
A. DEMONSTRATED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
WRITING ITSELF AND THE PARTIES' 
CONDUCT THEREUNDER, AMBIGUITIES EXIST 
IN THE "THORPE" CONTRACT THAT REQUIRE 
THE ADMISSION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
TO RESOLVE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT. 
The basic legal principles concerning the relationship 
of ambiguities and the parol evidence rule have been ably 
presented in both Appellants' and Respondents' Briefs. The 
remaining question concerns applicability to the "Thorpe" 
Contract of those recited principles. Appellants do not seek 
to have the Court "torture words and phrases to import 
ambiguity," nor do they expect such a finding at the mere 
urging of "differing contract interpretations." (Respondents' 
Brief at 8.) Rather, Appellants request that the Court 
examine the contractual language of the "Thorpe" Contract to 
ascertain what those written words stand for in connection 
with the particular conduct of the parties. E. A. Strout 
Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick 522 P.2d 144, 146 
(Utah 1974). 
In determining whether an ambiguity exists in a 
document, the test lies, not necessarily in the presence of 
isolated ambiguous words or phrases, but in whether or not 
those otherwise plain words become uncertain when applied to 
-3-
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the subject matter of the instrument. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Evidence § 1069 (1967). It is generally held that "latent" 
ambiguities may be clarified by parol evidence. Kennedy v. 
Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752, 753 (1939). A latent 
ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face 
of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first 
time by matter outside the writing. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence 
§ 1073 (1967). 
Utah has historically recognized the need to accept 
extrinsic evidence to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing, 
This Court in Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 
Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932), stated: 
One well-recognized exception to the 
rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or 
otherwise, is admissible to explain a 
latent ambiguity in a writing. This does 
not mean that terms or conditions may be 
inserted into or taken out of the writing 
by direct oral assertions, but it does 
mean that the court may receive evidence 
of such surrounding facts as will enable 
it to look upon the transaction through 
the eyes of the parties thereto and 
thereby know what they understood or 
intended the ambiguous word or provisions 
to mean. 
The Court went on to remark that where the conduct of the 
parties pursuant to a written agreement demonstrate an 
ambiguity in the interpretation of said agreement, it is 
"necessary for the court to know as much as the parties at 
-4-
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the time of signing knew about the subject matter." This 
enables the court, "so far as necessary, to see the transaction 
through the eyes and understanding of the parties." Id. 
Although old law, Fox Film continues to be valid law 
in Utah. In Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20, 22 
(1965) 1 this Court followed precedent and held that parol 
evidence was admissible, notwithstanding the clear and 
otherwise certain language of the agreement, to show that the 
actions of the parties demonstrated ambiguity in the intended 
contractual relationship. 
Defendants argue that the terms of the 
April 6, 1932, agreement are unambiguous and 
provide for a present sale as of that date, 
and that parol evidence cannot alter or 
change its plain meaning. This is generally 
true, but there are exceptions; one of which 
is that when the parties place their own 
construction on it and so perform, the 
court may consider this as persuasive 
evidence of what their true intention was. 
As recently as in E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Broderick 522 P.2d 144, 145-46 (Utah 1974), this Court cited 
Fox Film for its parol evidence holding and stated: 
Written words can be examined so as to 
ascertain what they stand for in connection 
with particular conduct or particular objects. 
Thus expressions of the parties prior to and 
contemporaneous with the execution of a 
written instrument may be helpful in 
understanding the meaning of the language 
used. However1 the defendant here does not 
seek to explain the meaning of a paragraph. 
He simply wants the court to eliminate it 
in its entirety. This the courts cannot do. 
-5-
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Appellants have no des·ire to eliminate the ambiguous 
portions of the "Thorpe 11 Contract. Rather, Appellants assert 
that the apparent incongruity between paragraphs 6 and 8 of 
said agreement becomes obvious upon examination of the 
surrounding circumstances of the parties at the time of 
contracting. 
In their Brief, Respondents attempt to eliminate any 
consideration by the Court of the intentions of the parties at 
the time of execution of the "Thorpe" Contract. They deem the 
respective balances of the "Pope" Agreement and the "Thorpe" 
Contract irrelevant to the conflict at hand. (Respondents' 
Brief at 11). Conversely, Appellants assert that since the 
crux of this case is the applicability of paragraph 8 of the 
'iThorpe" Contract to the "Pope" Agreement, a more relevant 
piece of evidence could not be imagined than the respective 
balances of the two Sales Contracts. 
If in fact at the time of its execution (as stipulated 
by Respondents (T. 12-13)) , the "Thorpe" Contract balance was 
less than the unpaid balance on the "Pope" Agreement, the 
intentions of the parties to exclude the "Pope" obligation from 
applicability to paragraph 8 are demonstrated and easily 
understood. Had the parties intended to so affect the "Pope" 
obligation, Respondents would have requested and Appellants 
-6-
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would have conveyed title to the subject property immediately. 
Instead, the parties commenced a regular course of conduct 
whereby the agreements were maintained separately with the 
outstanding balances decreasing at different rates of speed. 
The apparent conflict between paragraphs 6 and 8 
becomes unavoidable with an understanding of the actions of the 
parties. The typed clause ending the acknowledgement of the 
"Papen obligation in paragraph 6, "which shall be the Sellers 
obligation to pay and discharge" was clearl¥ meant to exempt 
that obligation from its applicability to paragraph 8. 
Respondents complain that "[t]here is no evidence that the 
underlying Pope balance was ever considered in the Thorpe 
Contract or that Thorpe or the Plaintiffs had any knowledge 
of the balance." (Respondents' Brief at 11-12). Appellants 
agree with Respondents' complaint; by failing to admit or 
consider such evidence1 the District Court erred by granting 
Summary Judgment. 
B. UNDISPUTED FACTS DISTINGUISH THE INSTANT 
CASE FROM JONES V. HINKLE AND PREVENT A 
PROPER GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF ·RESPONDENT. 
In their Brief, Respondents assert that the instant 
case is "almost identical" to this Court's decision of Jones v. 
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) and attempt to explain away 
-7-
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important distinguishing facts. (Respondents' Brief at 12-14). 
In doing so, however, Respondents fail to understand that the 
bases of dispute in this matter are the specific points which 
distinguish this action from Hinkle. 
Although the Contract in Hinkle was created from the 
same form used for the "Thorpe" Contract, the supplementation 
of the "Thorpe" paragraph 6 is unique and stands as the basis 
in writing for the ambiguous treatment of the "Pope" obligation. 
Appellants and Respondents desiring to demonstrate their intent 
not to include the "Pope" obligation in the assumability 
provision of paragraph 8, added that said obligation "shall be 
the Sellers obligation to pay and discharge." No such additional 
clause is found in the Hinkle Contract. 
From a careful reading of the facts in Hinkle, it is 
apparent that at the time of execution of that Contract, the 
balance of the underlying obligation was well under the 
Contract price. As discussed supra, the comparative balances 
at the time of execution of the "Thorpe" Contract, together with 
the subsequent actions of the parties, unambiguously demonstrate 
that the "Pope" obligation was never meant to be assumed by 
Respondents. 
Nct~.vi th standing Respondents' con tent ions to the 
contrary, "':he fact that the uPope" Agreement included additional 
-8-
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properties unincluded in the "Thorpe" Contract is relevant and 
material to the contractual intentions of the parties. Title 
to the entire property, subject of the "Pope" Agreement, does 
now rest and at all times since the execution thereof has 
rested with the Sellers under that Agreement. Notwithstanding 
the provisions of paragraph 8 of the "Thorpe" Contract and 
any alleged applicability thereof to the "Pope 11 obligation, 
Appellants are without title to convey to Respondents. It may 
by Quit Claim Deed, transfer its interest to said property, but 
it cannot convey title which it does not hold. In this respect 
"it would be impractical to attempt to divide title to the 
property while the entire title rests with Pope pending 
complete satisfaction of the original obligation." 
Brief at 16). 
(Respondents 1 
Related to the above distinguishing problem and 
relevant as to the parties original intentions is the matter 
of security offered for the "Pope" Agreement by Appellants. 
The "unincluded" portion of the "Pope" property and the 
additional properties required in the "Pope" Agreement to be 
offered by Appellants as security therefore would be unfairly 
encumbered by the assumption of the obligation by Respondents. 
Extrinsic evidence refused by the District Court would have 
shown that the intentions in and purposes of Appellants 
-9-
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entering into the "Thorpe" Contract concerned to a great 
extent the comparative payment schedules of the two Contracts. 
By applying the balloon payments from the subsequently 
negotiated "Thorpe" Contract directly to the "Pope" Agreement, 
said obligation would be satisfied on an accelerated basis 
freeing the "other" encumbered properties by as much as 12 
years earlier than otherwise scheduled. 
While Appellants rely upon none of the above distinguisr 
ing factual assertions exclusively as sufficient to require 
Summary Judgment to be rendered in Appellants' favor, taken as 
a whole, and uncontested as they stand, these specific points 
distinguish the present case from Hinkle and require the Court 
to examine the contractual intentions of the parties before 
rendering judgment. 
C. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPERLY 
REFUSED BY THE LOWER COURT, AND NONE 
SHOULD BE GRANTED ON APPEAL. 
Although Respondents rightfully take issue with 
Appellants' citation of Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and 
Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955) for 
the proposition that attorney's fees on appea: are di3cretiona~ 
with the Supreme Cou=t, Respondents fail to adequately 3nalyze 
the District Court's :-::-efusal to award attorney's fees at trial. 
Counsel apologizes for its use of the overruled 
Swain in its prior Brief, but recognizes an important 
-10-
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distinction between Management Services Corp. v. Development 
Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980), and the present case. 
In Management Services the Court overruled Swain and included 
an award of attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party 
on appeal, but did so only after the District Court had found 
that such an award was proper at trial. 
The District Court here found no default committed 
by the Appellants requiring an award of attorney's fees. The 
Court merely determined the rights and obligations of the 
respective parties. Any possible default could be committed 
only following the reduction of the "Thorpe" Contract to an 
amount less than that of the "Pope" Agreement. At no time did 
Respondents demand conveyance of any interest when they were 
so entitled, assuming, arguendo, that the "Pope" obligation 
was assumable. 
In Jones v. Hinkle 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980), unlike 
the present case, there were undisputed facts which required 
an award of attorney 1 s fees to accompany the Judgment. There, 
both parties agreed that the Hinkle Contract had been paid 
down to a balance below that of the underlying obligation. 
The Court found that upon Seller's refusal of Buyer's demand 
for conveyance, the Seller had defaulted in its obligations, 
thus attorney's fees were properly awarded the non-defaulting 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
party. As Respondents did not make their demand at a time 
when Appellants might have been required to convey, Appellants 
were not found in default. Therefore an award of attorney's 
fees is inappropriate either in the lower Court or on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The action of the lower Court in granting Respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. Based on the 
foregoing: analysis, this Court should remand the matter to the 
District Court for a trial on the issues concerning the parties' 
intentions concerning the paragraphs 6 and 8 of the "Thorpe" 
Contract and their respective application to the "Pope" 
obligation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <:(" day of September, 1982. 
~(1~ 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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